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Abstract 
Over the last decade, the foreign exchange derivatives market has witnessed a collapse of covered interest parity 
(CIP). Not only does this collapse give rise to large deviations from CIP, it has unlocked a stream of exploitable 
arbitrage opportunities across currencies. In this paper, we introduce two new factors - inflation differential and 
relative economic performance - as potential drivers of deviations from CIP. Employing data on G10 cross-currency 
basis swap spreads viz a viz the U.S. dollar, we document a striking new evidence that higher inflation differential 
and incremental improvement in relative economic performance drive the basis wider, and hence arbitrage profits 
higher for U.S. dollar investors, in the post crisis period. Our main empirical results in general are robust to an 
extended number of controls, variations in sampling frequency, and consideration of alternative specifications, but 
the additional explanatory power is low.  
Keywords: Cross-currency basis, inflation differential, relative economic performance  
JEL Classifications: E1, F3, G1 
1. Introduction 
This article investigates the effects of inflation differential and relative economic performance on cross-
currency basis, a measure of covered interest parity (CIP, henceforth) breakdown. The noticeable breakdown 
of the principle of CIP across many currencies is one of the most recent and well-known puzzles in the global 
fixed income and foreign exchange markets since the global financial crisis (GFC, henceforth) that emanated 
in the US in 2007/2008 and later spread to major developed capital markets and other parts of the world. In 
the international economics literature, the CIP is a no arbitrage condition that had been a major bedrock of 
other analytical models in standard open-economy macroeconomics – especially models that rely heavily on 
the no-arbitrage assumption – for several decades prior to the crisis. Given two currency pairs ($, €), CIP 
requires that borrowing in one currency ($), lending in the other currency (€) and hedging exchange rate risk 
with currency forwards, would yield a similar payoff in $. This condition broke down during the GFC; the 
deviations have since continued, which seems to suggest that agents can earn unlimited risk-free returns or 
benefit perpetually from lower funding cost.  
As such, two major consequences have emerged from this breakdown. First, large multilateral development 
institutions can possibly lower overall $ funding costs by first borrowing in, say, € and swapping proceeds 
to $. With this outcome, these institutions can access $ funds at more favorable rates, which help to enhance 
  
their support for governments or private sectors in developing countries. Second, the deviations make 
hedging activities potentially riskless and more profitable for arbitraging asset-managers at reserve banks 
and other large financial institutions. For instance, reserve banks often swap some of their foreign currency 
reserves against other currencies, such as the Yen, to boost returns. Nonetheless, limits could exist for such 
arbitrage activities since some arbitraging agents – such as banks and the financial institutions that depend 
on them – are directly or indirectly constrained by regulations that place capacity limits on the amount of 
exposure they can absorb at a time on their balance sheets. This therefore makes the cost-benefit advantage 
of leverage unfavorable. As noted by Rime et al. (2019), the riskless returns from CIP deviations are almost 
insignificant for most arbitrageurs when reconciled with the actual dollar funding rates incurred. Even those 
that incur the least funding rates, and thus are in the best position to reap the most benefits from CIP 
deviation activities, are inhibited by stringent regulations. 
 
Since surfacing in the wake of the GFC and subsequently, studies on CIP deviations have grown in the 
literature (Baba and Packer (2009), Du et al. (2018), Avdjiev et al. (2019)). A few studies have examined 
the emergence and implications of CIP deviations (Arai et al. (2016), Pozsar (2016), Courcel (2015, 2017), 
Nakaso (2017) and Ibhagui (2019)), and there seems to be some consensus in the literature that the 
turbulence which emerged in the GFC era led to dollar shortages that triggered CIP deviations. However, 
what remains largely unsettled are the prolonged existence, i.e. why the gap caused by CIP deviations has 
refused to close, and the drivers of the deviations, especially the various macroeconomic factors that are 
potentially linked to the evolution of CIP deviations. In some studies, such as Baba and Packer (2009), it 
has been suggested that the deviations are due to the existence of differences in counterparty risks. However, 
using both repo rates, to represent more secure borrowing and lending, and KfW bonds, Du et al. (2018) 
argue that CIP deviations are present even in the absence of counterparty risks. Thus, whether or not there 
are counterparty risks, it is clear that CIP deviations have remained. So, what factors drive these deviations? 
 
A growing number of studies have begun to focus actively on the potential drivers of CIP deviations. More 
recently, there have been significant interests in the different drivers of CIP deviations, especially in the 
post-GFC era, and a few potential candidates have emerged (see Ivashina et al. (2015) Baran and Whitzany 
(2017), Avdjiev et al. (2019), Du et al. (2018), and Ibhagui (2018, 2019)). One variable that has recently 
dominated in the literature as a major potential driver of CIP deviations is the strength of the trade weighted 
broad dollar index. Using a host of market-related financial variables as controls, Avdjiev et al. (2019) 
provide robust evidence that a stronger US dollar goes together with larger CIP deviations and contractions 
of cross-border dollar bank lending. They argue for the existence of a triangular relationship where the US 
dollar plays the role of a barometer of risk-taking in the global capital markets. Their main result establishes 
that contraction of cross-border dollar lending, induced by dollar appreciation, which limits supply of 
hedging activities, drives CIP deviations wider (that is, the basis becomes more negative in absolute terms).  
  
Other studies such as Ivashina et al. (2015), Du et al. (2018) and Rime et al. (2019) have argued for different 
limits to arbitrage which can potentially stifle the supply of dollar hedges, regardless of the level of demand 
for hedging activities, causing wider CIP deviations to persist. Du et al. (2018) argue for the existence of 
CIP deviations that cannot be explained by credit risks or transaction costs. They also show that bank 
balance sheet costs and asymmetric monetary policy shocks are important drivers of CIP deviations. Borio 
et al. (2018) document that net hedging demand needs explain the variations in CIP deviations observed 
across currencies. Looking at the corporate credit market, Liao (2016) examines corporate issuance patterns 
and links cost advantages, from the use of arbitrage in funding activities across currencies, with CIP 
deviations. Overall, the growing literature seems to suggest that factors which influence demand and supply 
of hedging activities should potentially impact the evolution of CIP deviations, at least in the short-run. 
 In another strand of the literature, several studies have noted that deviations from CIP can be explained by 
the relative funding liquidity risk premium of a currency vis-a’-vis the US dollars. A recent work along that 
line include Kohler and Muller (2019) who argue that relative funding liquidity risk affects not only the 
cash market but also the collateral markets as investors who exhibit a strong (weak) preference for US 
dollars (foreign currency) cash should also extend such preference to US dollar (foreign currency) 
denominated collateral. More importantly, they find that, among other measures, it is the cross-currency 
repo rates that best incorporate relative funding liquidity risk premium because the cash leg and the 
collateral leg are denominated in different currencies (for instance US dollar vs non-US dollar), which 
allows the collateral used to secure a transaction to be non-US dollar denominated. Using cross-currency 
repo rates to capture relative funding liquidity premium, they document that deviations from CIP are 
considerably smaller when calculated based on cross-currency repo rates instead of standard interest rates 
and that the remaining CIP deviations can be explained, in large parts, by the presence of different levels 
of positive and persistent relative funding liquidity risk premium arising due to the market’s preference for 
holding US dollars as opposed to most other currencies.  
In a related study, Wong and Zhang (2018) note that deviations from CIP are neither a mystery nor a 
financial market failure, but instead reflect a fair risk assessment or matching process that swap dealers 
undertake to adjusts prevailing interest rates in two different currencies to account for the differences that 
have developed in their risk characteristics over time and, in so doing, make a swap transaction fairer to 
parties involved. It is this adjustment - which aims to weigh each side by their degree of riskiness and ensure 
fairness to both sides of a swap transaction - that gives rise to deviations from CIP. According to them, 
Libor rates in two currencies are not equivalent as the currencies do not reflect equivalent risk levels, 
implying that the basis cannot be zero - otherwise a low risk counterparty would accept to ignore the 
riskiness of a high-risk counterparty and demand a premium or compensation for exposure to this high risk 
counterparty, a rationale which is clearly infeasible. They argue that the risk-adjustment process is 
necessary because, in general, funding liquidity and/or counterparty risk differ between domestic and 
  
foreign currency money markets, and the difference needs to be accounted for. Moreover, they also argue 
that the swap market functions as to separate counterparty risk and liquidity risk. They estimate that, on 
average, liquidity risk premium dominates counterparty risk premium for US dollars, while the reverse is 
true for the non-US dollar currencies, which is why swapping foreign currencies to US dollars (i.e. 
borrowing foreign currencies and lending US dollars) leads to the receipt of a greater discount from loans 
in foreign currencies, causing the bases to widen (more negative).  
 
Other related earlier studies in this stream include Wong, Leung, and Ng (2016) and Hui, Genberg, and 
Chung (2011). Wong et al. (2016) argue that CIP holds much better when controlling for relative funding 
liquidity risk. Using a procedure which decomposes CIP deviations into counterparty credit and funding 
liquidity risk, they find that funding liquidity risk component plays a more dominant role in explaining CIP 
deviations.  Meanwhile, in a 2-year event study of the GFC period, Hui et al. (2011) demonstrate that the 
observed CIP deviations could be explained by the existence and nature of liquidity constraints. They 
demonstrate that market-wide funding liquidity risk in the interbank market explain most of the deviations 
observed among major currency areas, especially in the pre-Lehman collapse. They show that counterparty 
credit risk also became important in the post-Lehman collapse as both counterparty risk and funding 
liquidity risk became significant determinants of CIP deviations in Europe. For Asia, they report much 
lower swap-implied US dollar interest rates in Hong Kong dollar, Singapore dollar, and Japanese Yen and 
attribute the relative discounts on these swap-implied rates to the relatively better dollar funding conditions 
(lower funding liquidity risk) in these Asian markets compared to Europe and even the US, which made 
these Asian markets an alternative source of dollar funding. Given the more benign dollar conditions Asia, 
their demand for dollars via the swap market was more limited, at least relative to European peers, lowering 
the swap-implied dollar costs in these currencies compared to European currencies for which swap-implied 
dollar costs became much more expensive because the extreme dollar funding strain in Europe implied 
higher dependence on the swap market as demand for dollars via the swap market elevates, pushing up the 
swap-implied dollar costs in these European currencies. The Federal Reserve Swap lines with central banks 
eased the liquidity pressure and lowered the swap-implied dollar costs in the European economies.  
Our focus in this article is therefore to explore new potential drivers of CIP deviations. We contribute to 
the growing literature by providing robust evidence that inflation differential and relative economic 
outcomes have played a significant role in the evolution of CIP deviations post GFC. We find that, in 
general, when economic performance improves, or inflation differential rises in a country relative to the 
US, cross-currency basis swap spreads tend to widen, implying larger CIP deviations. Across maturities, 
inflation differential emerges as one of the most robust and significant drivers of the cross-currency basis. 
Thus, deviations from CIP respond to increases in inflation differential so that when there is a rise in 
  
inflation differential, CIP deviations tend to be larger. This negative co-movement between inflation 
differential and CIP deviations holds across the five-year and three-month maturities of the basis and is 
robust when we control for a host of other existing drivers of CIP deviations. The negative relation between 
relative economic performance and CIP deviations is robust and significant across a host of controls for the 
five-year maturity but loses its statistical significance for the three-month maturity when we control for 
other drivers of the basis, though the negative relation remains.  
Our results also confirm previous findings, such as negative relations between dollar strength and CIP 
deviations (Avdjiev et al. (2019)). Our main results are robust to these previous findings. Furthermore, we 
examine the effect of inflation beta – representing the sensitivity of CIP deviations to inflation differentials 
– on the average level of cross-currency basis. This helps to determine whether disparities in the response 
of CIP deviations to inflation differential can explain incongruencies in arbitrage returns, or the magnitude 
of the cross-currency basis, across countries. In a cross-section framework, we show that currencies with 
higher exposure or sensitivity to inflation differential - that is those whose inflation betas increase to signal 
an increased sensitivity of CIP deviations to inflation differential - have larger CIP deviations and 
potentially higher arbitrage profits, where the arbitrage profits correspond to the magnitude of the average 
level of the cross-currency basis. This result provides some evidence that discrepancy in responses to 
inflation differential across currencies could potentially explain the dissimilarity in arbitrage profits 
associated with CIP deviations across countries. 
Why do CIP deviations widen when inflation differential increases and relative confidence in the economy 
improves? Drawing from Chen (2010) and Avdjiev et al. (2019), we argue that possible answers to these 
questions follow from the links between economic performance and credit spreads, and between the dollar 
and cross-currency basis. First, a rise in inflation differential between country 𝑘 and the US can induce 
depreciation of currency k, which can put an upward pressure on the dollar. As Avdjiev et al. (2019) note, 
higher dollar strength then leads to wider cross-currency basis. Thus, a rise in inflation differential leads to 
wider basis if currency depreciation, and hence dollar appreciation, accompanies increases in inflation 
differential and dominates in the transmission mechanism. Also, the result could operate via a dollar-asset 
demand channel. Under this mechanism, a rise in inflation differential induces an increase in demand for 
dollar-denominated fixed income assets hedged into some non-dollar benchmark rate as investors move to 
circumvent the ills of inflation on their positions. This demand for dollar-denominated fixed income assets 
increases the cost of synthetic dollars, which then widens the cross-currency basis and expands deviations 
from CIP. This channel takes the view that wider CIP deviations is a result of investors’ desire to avoid the 
ills of rising inflation by holding dollar-denominated fixed income assets (hedged into local currency 
benchmark rate).  
  
Second, and reasoning in line with Chen (2010), we note that, more often, when there are indications of 
better economic performance, credit spreads tend to tighten as improved economic confidence reduces 
uncertainty, increases business confidence and improves general perception of risk. The lower spreads thus 
induce higher issuance volumes in these currencies as lower spreads imply lower funding costs, 
consequently leading to higher hedging demand for dollar swaps and thus wider basis when higher demand 
for dollar hedges dominates in the transmission mechanism. In general, higher issuance in nondollar 
currencies can generate positive shocks to demand for hedging activity that leads to higher demand for 
dollar hedges and, through that, a wider cross-currency basis which worsens CIP deviations. Our paper also 
draws on Kohler and Muller (2019) to provide intuition of how lower borrowing costs in foreign currencies 
might elevate relative funding liquidity risk premium demanded by US dollar-based agents and thereafter 
trigger a wider cross-currency basis across currencies over time. 
Overall, the major contribution of our paper is uncovering the hitherto unknown relationship between 
inflation differential and CIP deviations. To our knowledge, this is the first study in the more liquid G10 
currency derivatives markets to initiate discussions along this path1. Our study also adds to the sparse but 
growing evidence that inflation is a priced risk factor in the financial market. Examining the equities market, 
Boons, Duarte, de Roon, & Szymanowska (2019) use a consumption-based asset pricing model to show 
that inflation risk is priced in stock returns and argue for evidence of time variation in inflation risk premia 
in the cross-section and aggregate stock market. In this paper, we use a simple allied monetary-based model 
backed by empirical evidence to document that inflation differential is a priced risk factor in the cross-
currency basis markets for G10 currencies viz-a-viz the dollar, a market where deviations from CIP writ 
large.  
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple stylized empirical framework on 
which the empirical analysis is built. Section 3 presents the data and empirical analysis, Section 4 presents 
additional robustness checks. Section 5 discusses empirical results. Section 6 presents inflation differential 
as a priced risk factor for the basis. We conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Empirical Framework 
Drawing on a modified Taylor rule a’ la’ Amano and Ambler (2014) and Engel et al. (2017), in this section, 
we provide a stylized empirical framework where we express CIP deviations as a function of inflation 
differential and relative economic performance. The subsequent empirical results in the next section reveals 
that higher inflation differential and stronger economic performance go hand-in-hand with wider CIP 
 
1
 In an earlier study, Cheung and Qian (2011) have documented a link between inflation volatility and CIP deviations 
for the Chinese Renminbi. Our work differs markedly from their work in aim and scope. First, while they study CIP 
deviations in China, our work instead focuses on the 10 most liquid currencies. Second and importantly, while they 
use inflation volatility as one of their economic stability variables, here we present a formal modelling framework that 
uses inflation differentials to study the behavior of CIP deviations over time. 
  
deviations post Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The results are robust to the inclusion of major covariates 
that have been established in the literature as strong drivers of CIP deviations. 
2.1 A Simple Stylized Empirical Framework 
In general, when CIP condition holds, CIP deviations and hence the cross-currency basis are zero. Thus, 𝑓𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑖𝑡,𝑡+1𝑈𝑆                                                                        (1𝑎) 
where 𝑓 = log𝐹 and 𝑠 = log 𝑆 are the forward and spot exchange rate per dollar; 𝑖 and 𝑖𝑈𝑆 are interest 
rates in the foreign (non-USD) and USD currencies, and 𝑘 = 1,… .𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1… , 𝑇 are the country and 
time dimensions. The corresponding regression specification is: 𝑓𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑖𝑡,𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + 𝜀𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1                                                  (1𝑏) 
With deviations from CIP, however,  𝑓𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑘𝑡 ≠ 𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑖𝑡,𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 , and there is a basis swap spread 𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1, added to the non-dollar interest leg, such that (1a) becomes: 𝑓𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑘𝑡 = (𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 + 𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1) − 𝑖𝑡,𝑡+1𝑈𝑆   or  𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 = (𝑓𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑡) − (𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑖𝑡,𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 )                                               (1𝑐) 
Subtracting 𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1𝑈𝑆  from both sides of (1b) and combining with the expression in (1c), we get: 𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1 − 1)(𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + 𝜀𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1                                  (1𝑑) 
Next, we obtain a relation expressing changes in cross-currency basis in terms of inflation differential and 
relative economic performance, where inflation differential is defined as changes in the difference in consumer 
price index (log CPI) between country 𝑘 and the US, while relative economic performance represents changes 
in the difference in purchasing manager’s index (PMI) between country 𝑘 and the US. 
In a recent study, Engel et.al (2018) specify a model in which a Taylor rule determines monetary policy 
while Amano and Ambler (2014) develop a modified Taylor rule based on a price-targeting framework. 
Following these studies, we can write the US nominal interest rate as 𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 = 𝛾0𝑈𝑆 + 𝛾1𝑈𝑆𝑝𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 + 𝛾2𝑈𝑆𝑦𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 , 𝛾𝑙𝑈𝑆 > 0,  𝑙 = 1,2                                (2𝑎) 
Where, in our specification, 𝑝𝑡+1𝑈𝑆  and 𝑦𝑡+1𝑈𝑆  are the CPI (in logs) and PMI, a high-frequency measure of 
economic sentiment or output performance.  
Suppose a similar relation holds in the foreign country, 𝑘, we have 
  
                                                𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑝𝑘𝑡+1 + 𝛾2 𝑦𝑘𝑡+1 , 𝛾𝑙 > 0, 𝑙 = 1,2                                 (2𝑏)   
Subtracting (2a) from (2b), we get 𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 = (𝛾0 − 𝛾0𝑈𝑆) + (𝛾1 𝑝𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝛾1𝑈𝑆𝑝𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + (𝛾2 𝑦𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝛾2𝑈𝑆𝑦𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 )                     (2𝑐) 
which, together with (1d), yields  𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1 − 1)(𝛾0 − 𝛾0𝑈𝑆) + (𝛽1 − 1)(𝛾1 𝑝𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝛾1𝑈𝑆𝑝𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + (𝛽1 − 1)(𝛾2 𝑦𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝛾2𝑈𝑆𝑦𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + 𝜀𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1  (3a) 
Assume parameters are identical, we have 𝛾𝑙 = 𝛾𝑙𝑈𝑆, 𝑙 = 0,1,2, and 𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝐴1(𝑝𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + 𝐴2(𝑦𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + 𝜀𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1                          (3𝑏) 
where 𝐴1 = 𝛾1 (𝛽1 − 1) and  𝐴2 = 𝛾2 (𝛽1 − 1).   
First difference of (3𝑏) yields ∆𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝐴0 + 𝐴1∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + 𝐴2∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + 𝜀𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1                                 (4𝑎) 
which is our baseline regression. Including other control variables, we have ∆𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝐴0 + 𝐴1∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + 𝐴2∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ) + 𝑩𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡,𝑡+1                                 (4𝑏) 
where ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ), which are changes in log CPI differential, corresponds to inflation differential 
between country 𝑘 and the US, while ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1𝑈𝑆 ), which represents changes in PMI differential, 
corresponds to relative economic performance between country 𝑘 and the US, and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 is a vector of 
covariates or control variables that have been identified in the literature as potential drivers of cross-currency 
basis swap spreads while 𝑩 contains the estimated coefficients on the corresponding 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆. The 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 = (∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡,𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡, ∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡, ∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡, ∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡, ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡, ∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 −𝑇𝑆𝑡𝑈𝑆), where ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡 stands for changes in the US trade-weighted broad dollar index. The base currency is 
US dollars, so an increase in the broad dollar, i.e. ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡 > 0 denotes dollar appreciation. 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡 is 
the nominal exchange rate measured in the number of units of each G10 currency per unit of the US 
dollar, ∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the log changes in the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options to control for changes 
in global risk sentiment, ∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡 represents changes in the implied volatility of FX to capture the 
risk-neutral volatility of FX movements, ∆25𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 represent changes in 25-delta FX option risk reversals ( 
that is, the difference between the volatility of call and put price at the 25 delta, out of money) to control for 
the cost of hedging against the appreciation of the base currency (dollar appreciation). A high value of ∆25𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 > 0 implies the cost of hedging against dollar appreciation has increased because the market is now 
pricing in a higher likelihood of a broad dollar appreciation. ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡 represent changes in the 
treasury yield spread at the 10-year maturity while ∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 − 𝑇𝑆𝑡𝑈𝑆) denote changes in the term spread 
  
different (10-year over 2-year). Both control for the potential divergence in monetary policy between each 
foreign country and the US. All variables are in first difference and stationary, so the problem of non-
stationarity does not arise. 
Notice that the specification in (4a-b), irrespective of the controls included, requires that  𝐴1𝐴2 > 0 because  𝛾𝑙 > 0, 𝑙 = 1,2 from (2b), and 𝐴1 = 𝛾1 (𝛽1 − 1) and  𝐴2 = 𝛾2 (𝛽1 − 1) means 𝐴1𝐴2 = 𝛾1 (𝛽1−1) 𝛾2 (𝛽1−1) > 0 for |𝛾𝑙 | <∞. Now,  𝐴1𝐴2 > 0 suggests that either i) 𝐴1 < 0 and 𝐴2 < 0  or ii) 𝐴1 > 0 and 𝐴2 > 0. That is, our specification 
requires inflation differential and relative economic performance to have similar effects, but of possibly 
different magnitude, on the basis. Both cases are feasible and theoretically possible. The case for which 𝐴1 <0 and 𝐴2 < 0  correspond to a wider basis emanating from an increase in inflation differential and a rise in 
relative economic performance in country 𝑘 relative to the US. The outcome 𝐴1 < 0 could occur, for instance, 
to the extent that a rise in inflation differential in country 𝑘 induces currency depreciations and broad dollar 
appreciations. Studies such as Avdjiev et al. (2019) have documented a relationship where a rise in broad 
dollar strength leads to wider basis. So, we would expect the basis to widen if higher inflation differential 
triggers a rise in broad dollar strength. Looking at the scenario where 𝐴2 < 0, studies such as Chen (2010) 
have shown that credit spreads tend to widen in response to poor economic performance. Thus, to the extent 
that better economic sentiment lowers credit spreads, we would expect the lower spreads to lessen borrowing 
costs, accelerate borrowings in currency 𝑘 and raise demand for dollar hedges. In this instance, the cross-
currency basis would widen if demand for dollar hedges dominates in the transmission mechanism. 
The condition 𝐴1 > 0 and 𝐴2 > 0 corresponds to the instance where both a rise in inflation differential and 
improvements in economic conditions in country 𝑘 relative to the US lead to tighter cross-currency basis that 
lessens CIP deviations. 𝐴1 > 0 could occur, for example, if a rise in inflation differential induces higher 
interest rate increases that prevent currency depreciations (or prevent broad dollar appreciations, leading to a 
tighter basis) and/or raise overall borrowing costs in currency 𝑘, which lowers issuance in currency 𝑘 and 
hence reduces demand for dollar hedges, causing the basis to tighten. 𝐴2 > 0 could occur if an improvement 
in economic sentiment in country 𝑘 relative to the US releases the counter-cycle nature of the dollar, causing 
the broad dollar index to in fact weaken, or if the improved economic performance is sustained and induces 
a flow of supply of dollar hedges to country 𝑘′𝑠 asset, which overshadows any demand for dollar hedges and 
causes the basis to tighten.  In the next section, we estimate the baseline regression and control for other 
drivers of the cross-currency basis. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we present information on the data utilized for the empirical analysis that examines the empirical 
merits of the proposed drivers of the cross-currency basis. After presenting information on the data, we 
  
graphically illustrate the relationship between the basis and the proposed drivers. Finally, we perform formal 
econometrical analysis to establish the relationship between these drivers and the basis. 
 
3.1 Data 
Our analysis is based on data obtained from Bloomberg and our sample period ranges from January 2010 to 
January 2019. We focus on the dollar cross-currency basis associated with the G10 currencies -Australian 
dollar, Canadian dollar, the Swiss franc, the Danish krone, the euro, the British pound, the Japanese yen, the 
Norwegian krone, New Zealand and the Swedish krona. All data are sourced from Bloomberg. Our sample 
period ranges from January 2010 to December 2018. Our regressions are based on monthly frequency as this is 
the highest possible frequency for which economic data such as PMI and CPI are reported.  The variables and 
their sources are reported in Table 1a below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a: Data and Sources 
Variable Source 
Dollar Cross-currency Basis Swap Spread (xccy) Bloomberg 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) Bloomberg, FRED 
Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) Bloomberg 
Trade-Weighted Broad Dollar Index (Dollar) Bloomberg, FRED 
Volatility Index (VIX) Bloomberg 
Bilateral Exchange Rate (Bilateral) Bloomberg 
Implied Volatility of FX Options (Imply Vol) Bloomberg 
25-Delta FX Options Risk Reversal (25DRR) Bloomberg 
10-Year US Treasury Yield Bloomberg 
10-Year Foreign Country Treasury Yield Bloomberg 
2-Year US Treasury Yield Bloomberg 
2-Year Foreign Country Treasury Yield 
 
Libor-OIS Spreads 
Bloomberg 
 
Bloomberg 
 
Note: In line with the literature, the cross-currency basis are the 3-month and the 5-year cross currency bases in percentage points 
for the period between January 2010 and December 2018.  We exclude Australia and New Zealand because their CPI variable for 
inflation computation are reported only on a quarterly frequency which is a lower frequency than the preferred monthly frequency. 
For the rest countries, all variables are reported at the monthly frequency. In Appendix A3i and A3ii, we show that our results 
are mostly robust when we use quarterly frequency data, especially for the 5-year basis 
 
Table 1b displays summary statistics for the G10 cross-currency dollar bases. In general, it turns out that 
negative levels of the bases have, on average, dominated across currencies over time. In simple terms, this 
implies that the US dollar is taken as more desirable than the negative-basis currencies. As such, holders of 
these currencies are willing to forfeit some potential returns and accept a discount (lower interest) to provide 
  
their own currencies in the swap market. On the other hand, they pay a premium to access dollar liquidity, 
which means that dollar liquidity is more expensive in the swap market for holders of more negative-basis 
currencies. Further, a negative basis has two main implications, among others. First, dollar-based investors, 
with access to investible dollar capital, can, on average, generate higher dollar returns from investments in 
foreign bonds than investments in domestic dollar-denominated bonds. These higher returns are possible by 
purchasing foreign bonds and hedging the stream of interest into US dollar Libor using cross-currency swaps. 
Second, ceteris paribus, foreign entities can borrow their own currencies at a lower cost via cross-currency 
swaps compared to borrowing directly in their domestic cash market. This is possible because, when the basis 
is negative, possession of dollars enables foreign entities to access their negative-basis currencies more 
cheaply via cross-currency swaps.  
 
Meanwhile, currencies with positive dollar basis i.e. AUD, NZD have an opposite interpretation. Holders of 
positive-basis currencies consider the dollar as less special relative to their own currencies and hence can pay 
a discount to access dollar funding in the swap market. On the other hand, dollar holders willingly accept this 
discount in order to access these positive-basis currencies even at a premium. Thus, agents with positive-basis 
currencies can raise dollars more cheaply via cross-currency swaps by funding with the positive-basis 
currencies than by borrowing dollars directly in the dollar cash market. Similarly, foreign entities with 
positive-basis currencies can earn higher returns in these currencies by purchasing US bonds and hedging the 
stream of interests into their currencies instead of directly purchasing bonds denominated in their currencies. 
 
Table 1b: Summary Statistics 
 
5-year basis 3-month basis  
Currency Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
AUD 24.81 4.06 3.98 15.22 
CAD 5.20 10.11 -9.94 13.78 
CHF -34.98 17.97 -22.69 19.78 
DKK -45.32 22.95 -57.04 32.76 
EUR -27.32 17.22 -30.23 26.24 
GBP -5.09 7.44 -13.67 19.36 
JPY -62.12 16.73 -39.97 18.07 
NOK -17.45 11.43 -32.67 25.83 
NZD 26.67 14.12    9.67 11.11 
SEK -7.57 9.36 -19.32 15.14 
Table 1b displays summary statistics of the mean and standard deviation of the cross-currency basis swap spreads expressed in 
basis points. Source: Bloomberg. Author estimations 
Furthermore, we also present summary statistics of the main variables, inflation differential and relative 
economic performance, that enter our regressions. Table 1c below displays the summary statistics of our 
variables of interest - the inflation differential and relative economic performance – and maps the mean and 
standard deviation of both variables to their corresponding countries. A positive average inflation 
differential suggests that average inflation in country 𝑖 has been higher than the corresponding average 
  
inflation in the US over the sample period. A positive relative economic performance implies that on 
average the economy performs increasingly better from period to period in country 𝑖 relative to the US over 
the sample period.  
Combining Tables 1b and 1c, the summary statistics of our variables of interest provides some interesting 
preliminary insights. First, it shows that high or more positive average inflation differential corresponds to 
countries with wider, more negative or least positive average bases, i.e. CHF, JPY, DKK, EUR and SEK to 
some extent, whereas countries with low or more negative average inflation differential are often those with 
tighter, more positive or least negative average bases, i.e. AUD, CAD, GBP and NZD. Second, the summary 
statistics also provide some evidence that countries with positive average relative economic performance tend 
to have more negative average bases, i.e. CHF, DKK and EUR, while those with negative average relative 
economic performance, to some extent, tend to have positive average bases, i.e. SEK, NZD and GBP. 
 
In sum, among others, the summary statistics reveal an important stylized idea: On average, countries with 
positive or higher inflation differential relative to the US seem to be among those with wider or more negative 
bases while those with negative or lower inflation differential tend to be among those with tighter or more 
positive bases over the sample period. Together with other empirical analyses, these preliminary insights and 
stylized ideas would formally be developed and rigorously tested in the subsequent sections of this article. 
 
 
Table 1c: Summary statistics for main variables of interest 
 
     Inflation Differential (%)                       ∆(𝒑𝒌𝒕 − 𝒑𝒌𝒕𝑼𝑺) Relative Economic Performance (%)              ∆(𝒚𝒌𝒕 − 𝒚𝒕𝑼𝑺)  
Currency Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
AUD -0.018 0.013  0.031 3.341 
CAD  0.002 0.307  0.030 7.360 
CHF  0.151 0.395  0.043 2.462 
DKK  0.042 0.409  0.097 5.149 
EUR  0.021 0.479  0.012 1.663 
GBP -0.048 0.396  0.011 2.252 
JPY  0.110 0.362  0.002 3.628 
NOK -0.039 0.498 -0.029 2.146 
NZD -0.000 0.012 -0.022 3.018 
SEK  0.048 0.427 -0.058 2.387 
Source: Bloomberg. Author estimations. Table 1c displays summary statistics of the mean and standard deviation of the inflation 
differential and relative economic performance. Except for Australia and New Zealand price level data which are only available 
quarterly, others are monthly changes. Inflation differential is change in log price differential while relative economic performance 
is change in PMI differential, where for each variable each differential is taken in each country relative to the US. 
Figures 1a and 1b below plot the mean inflation differential (in red) and relative economic performance (in 
yellow) respectively. When the yellow line rises, relative economic performance improves in favour of the 
  
foreign country; when the red line goes up, inflation differential rises which means inflation in the foreign 
country increases relative to the US. The green line plots the mean dollar cross-currency basis for the liquid 
currencies considered2.  
Figure 1a: Inflation differential and the cross-currency basis 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Relative economic performance and the cross-currency basis 
 
Source: Authors, 2020 based on Bloomberg Data. 
 
 
2
 We first exclude Australia and New Zealand because both countries only report CPI inflation data quarterly, which is of a lower frequency 
and at odds with the rest countries that report economic data at the highest possible frequency - monthly. In Appendix A3i and A3ii, we 
show that our results are mostly when we use quarterly frequency data, especially for the 5-year basis. 
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From figures 1a and 1b, we see that the basis generally moves in the opposite direction of inflation 
differential and relative economic performance. When inflation differential rises, the basis goes down which 
means it becomes more negative (as in figure 1a) and when relative economic performance increases (as in 
figure1b), the basis goes down too; it becomes more negative which means CIP deviations worsen.  
 
3.2 Empirical Analysis 
We now perform formal empirical analysis to establish the relationship among cross-currency basis, 
inflation differential and relative economic performance. In our baseline regression, we estimate the 
specification in (4a) (without the controls) which proposes two potential drivers of changes in the basis. 
We perform the analysis for the post GFC crisis period - 2010 to 20183. In subsequent robustness checks, 
we follow the procedure in Avdjiev et.al (2019) and include other control variables which have been 
identified as potential drivers of the basis in the literature. These variables include: 1) trade-weighted dollar 
index and bilateral exchange rate, to evaluate the effect of dollar strength on the basis; 2) VIX index to 
control for global risk sentiment; 3) implied volatility of FX options to control for risk-neutral volatility of 
FX movements, and 25-delta risk reversal of FX options to control for the cost of hedging against large 
depreciations; 4) 10-year yield spread – that is, spread of the 10-year Treasury yield of country k over the 
US 10-year Treasury yield, and 5) spread of foreign and US Treasury term spread, where the term spread 
is the slope of the Treasury yield curve of 10-year versus 2-year. Our full results are reported in Tables 2a 
and 2b. In final robustness checks, we also include Libor-OIS as controls in the regressions and report 
results in Tables 2c and 2d. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Although not our focus or aim in this paper, we also report results for the sample period – 2002 to 2018, pre-crisis – 2002 to 2006, and GFC 
crisis – 2007 to 2009 in the appendix. As CIP deviations were generally close to zero in the pre-crisis era, relative economic performance and 
inflation differential had no significant economic impact on the basis in this era. Also, all the commonly cited potential drivers of the basis do not 
have any power to driver changes in the basis in the pre-crisis period. During the GFC period when noticeable deviations from CIP emerged, the 
potential drivers of the basis, which had immaterial impact prior to the crisis, began to show importance and significance. After controlling for 
other notable drivers of the basis, the effect of relative economic performance and inflation differential on the basis is negative. The broad dollar 
strength and general risk sentiment, measured by VIX, are negatively linked to the basis.  
 
  
Table 2a: Regression results of the 5-year and 3-month cross-currency basis 
    
5-year basis 
         
3-month basis 
    
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) ∆(𝒑𝒌𝒕 − 𝒑𝒕𝑼𝑺) -1.102*** -1.108*** -1.255*** -1.258*** -1.145*** -1.168*** -1.133*** -1.064***  ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡𝑈𝑆) -0.994*** -0.999*** -1.250*** -1.252*** -1.181*** -1.188*** -1.203*** -1.133*** 
 
(0.331) (0.314) (0.313) (0.313) (0.311) (0.311) (0.311) (0.308) 
  
(0.489) (0.482) (0.480) (0.480) (0.481) (0.482) (0.483) (0.482) ∆(𝒚𝒌𝒕 − 𝒚𝒕𝑼𝑺) -0.103*** -0.098*** -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.086***  ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆) -0.075* -0.071* -0.061 -0.061 -0.059 -0.060 -0.061 -0.055 
 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
  
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)         ∆𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒕 -0.988*** -0.949*** -0.937*** -0.839*** -0.806*** -0.748*** -0.658***  ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡 -0.769*** -0.702*** -0.697*** -0.635*** -0.625*** -0.650*** -0.559*** 
  
(0.099) (0.099) (0.102) (0.103) (0.104) (0.108) (0.109) 
   
(0.153) (0.151) (0.156) (0.160) (0.162) (0.168) (0.171) ∆𝒍𝒏𝑽𝑰𝑿𝒕   -2.841*** -2.886*** -1.519*** -1.516*** -1.735*** -1.494***  ∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡   -4.862*** -4.881*** -4.023*** -4.022*** -3.928*** -3.683*** 
   
(0.687) (0.693) (0.757) (0.755) (0.763) (0.757) 
 
 
  
(1.054) (1.063) (1.171) (1.172) (1.185) (1.184) ∆𝑩𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒕    -0.081 -0.085 -0.052 -0.009 -0.010  ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡    -0.034 -0.037 -0.026 -0.044 -0.045 
    
(0.155) (0.154) (0.154) (0.156) (0.154) 
 
 
   
(0.238) (0.238) (0.239) (0.242) (0.241) ∆𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒌𝒕     -0.650*** -0.597*** -0.629*** -0.597***  ∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡     -0.408* -0.391* -0.377 -0.345 
     
(0.152) (0.154) (0.154) (0.153) 
 
 
    
(0.235) (0.238) (0.240) (0.239) ∆𝟐𝟓𝑫𝑹𝑹𝒌𝒕      -0.792*** -0.775*** -0.708***  ∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡      -0.259 -0.266 -0.198 
      
(0.371) (0.371) (0.367) 
 
 
     
(0.576) (0.576) (0.574) ∆𝒀𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒌𝒕       2.257*** 5.021***  ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡       -0.967 1.841 
       
(1.167) (1.318) 
 
 
      
(1.814) (2.062) ∆(𝑻𝑺𝒌𝒕 − 𝑻𝑺𝑼𝑺)        -5.539***  ∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 − 𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑆)        -5.627*** 
        
(1.273) 
 
 
       
(1.992) 
                   
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 857 857 857 857 857 857 857 857  𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 857 857 857 857 857 857 857 857 𝑹𝟐 0.027 0.120 0.145 0.146 0.164 0.168 0.172 0.190  𝑅2 0.008 0.037 0.060 0.060 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.073 
  Fixed effects included? No No No        No    No No No No    Fixed effects 
included? 
No No No No No No No No 
 Note *, **, *** 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively while standard errors in parenthesis are robust. Currency fixed effects are excluded. This table shows regression results of monthly changes in the 5-year and 
3-month Libor cross currency basis on changes in log CPI differential ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆)  (that is, inflation differential) and changes in PMI differential ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆), (relative economic performance) and other controls. The 
dependent variables are the monthly changes in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross-currency basis. The regressors of interest are the inflation differential ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆) and relative economic performance  ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆). The 
other independent variables (controls) are: ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡, monthly change in the federal reserve board (FRB) trade-weighted broad dollar index, where ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡>0 implies broad dollar appreciation ; ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡, monthly change 
in the bilateral spot exchange rate of the local currency per dollar so that ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡 > 0 implies appreciation of the dollar against the local currency; ∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡, monthly change in the log of volatility index (VIX),  ∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡 change in the log of implied volatility on 3-month at-the-money currency options; ∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡,  monthly change in the 25-delta risk reversal; ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡 is the monthly change in yield spread; ∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 − 𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑆) is 
the change in the term spread (TS), that is, the change in the difference between the foreign and US Treasury term spreads (10-year over 2-year).  
Sources: Bloomberg; FRED, author’s calculations 
 
  
Table 2b: Regression results of the 5-year and 3-month cross-currency basis: Further robustness (currency fixed effects included in specifications) 
    
5-year basis 
        
  3-month basis 
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ∆(𝒑𝒌𝒕 − 𝒑𝒕𝑼𝑺) -1.105*** -1.112*** -1.262*** -1.266*** -1.150*** -1.172*** -1.135*** -1.071***  ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡𝑈𝑆) -1.002*** -1.007*** -1.265*** -1.266*** -1.194*** -1.201*** -1.216*** -1.151*** 
 
(0.337) (0.319) (0.318) (0.318) (0.316) (0.316) (0.316) (0.313) 
  
(0.497) (0.490) (0.488) (0.488) (0.489) (0.490) (0.491) (0.489) ∆(𝒚𝒌𝒕 − 𝒚𝒕𝑼𝑺) -0.104*** -0.098*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.087***  ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆) -0.075* -0.071* -0.061 -0.061 -0.059 -0.060 -0.060 -0.055 
 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
  
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)         ∆𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒕  -0.988*** -0.949*** -0.937*** -0.839*** -0.806*** -0.747*** -0.656***          ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡  -0.769*** -0.702*** -0.698*** -0.637*** -0.627*** -0.650*** -0.557*** 
  
(0.100) (0.099) (0.102) (0.104) (0.105) (0.109) (0.110) 
   
(0.153) (0.152) (0.157) (0.160) (0.162) (0.169) (0.171) ∆𝒍𝒏𝑽𝑰𝑿𝒕   -2.843*** -2.886*** -1.518*** -1.514*** -1.738*** -1.498***  ∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡   -4.867*** -4.880*** -4.027*** -4.026*** -3.939*** -3.695*** 
   
(0.690) (0.695) (0.760) (0.758) (0.765) (0.759) 
    
(1.058) (1.067) (1.176) (1.176) (1.190) (1.188) ∆𝑩𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒕    -0.078 -0.083 -0.050 -0.005 -0.006  ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡    -0.023 -0.027 -0.016 -0.033 -0.034 
    
(0.157) (0.155) (0.156) (0.157) (0.155) 
     
(0.240) (0.240) (0.241) (0.244) (0.243) ∆𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒌𝒕     -0.650*** -0.598*** -0.630*** -0.597***  ∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡     -0.406* -0.389* -0.376 -0.343 
     
(0.153) (0.154) (0.155) (0.153) 
      
(0.236) (0.239) (0.241) (0.240) ∆𝟐𝟓𝑫𝑹𝑹𝒌𝒕      -0.792*** -0.775*** -0.706***  ∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡      -0.258 -0.265 -0.195 
      
(0.372) (0.372) (0.368) 
       
(0.578) (0.578) (0.576) ∆𝒀𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒌𝒕       2.307** 5.120***  ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡       -0.895 1.981 
       
(1.174) (1.327) 
        
(1.826) (2.078) ∆(𝑻𝑺𝒌𝒕 − 𝑻𝑺𝑼𝑺)        -5.604***  ∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡− 𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑆)        -5.729**         
(1.280) 
         
(2.004) 
                   
                   𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 857 857 857 857 857 857 857 857  𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔     857 857 857 857 857 857 857 857 𝑹𝟐 0.028 0.130 0.147 0.147 0.165 0.170 0.173 0.192  𝑹𝟐  0.009 0.038 0.061 0.061 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.074 
Fixed effects included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Fixed effects 
included? 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note *, **, *** 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust. Currency fixed effects are included. This table shows regression results of monthly changes in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross 
currency basis on changes in log CPI differential ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆)  (that is, inflation differential) and changes in PMI differential ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆), (relative economic performance) and other controls. The dependent variables are the monthly changes 
in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross-currency basis. The regressors of interest are the inflation differential ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆) and relative economic performance  ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆). The other independent variables (controls) are: ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡, monthly 
change in the federal reserve board (FRB) trade-weighted broad dollar index, where ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡>0 implies broad dollar appreciation ; ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡, monthly change in the bilateral spot exchange rate of the local currency per dollar so that ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡 > 0 implies appreciation of the dollar against the local currency; ∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡, monthly change in the log of volatility index (VIX),  ∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡 change in the log of implied volatility on 3-month at-the-money currency 
options; ∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡,  monthly change in the 25-delta risk reversal; ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡 is the monthly change in yield spread; ∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 − 𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑆) is the change in the term spread (TS), that is, the change in the difference between the foreign and US 
Treasury term spreads (10-year over 2-year). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust.  Currency fixed effects are included in all specifications.  
Sources: Bloomberg; FRED, author’s calculations 
 
 
  
 
  
4. Additional Robustness Checks 
It is well known among researchers and practitioners and in the literature that dollar-funding liquidity stress, 
which often morphs into notable deviations from CIP (i.e. wider basis) in the money markets, is reflected 
in the Libor-OIS spread. The Libor-OIS spread is a measure of the degree of financial strain in the banking 
system. Because it is an indication of banks' perception of the creditworthiness of other financial institutions 
and the availability of funds for lending purposes, it reveals the additional premium over the OIS (overnight 
indexed swap) that major banks demand (or pay) in order to lend to (or borrow from) one another and to 
other financial institutions. When this spread is high, especially when the high spread coincides with lower 
OIS rate, this is usually an indication of high dollar-funding liquidity stress as major banks become more 
reluctant to lend, and thus demand a higher premium to lend, due to heightened fear of default probability 
or elevated counterparty risk. This indicates companies are having trouble raising finance and limits the 
ability to take on leverage. Conversely, a low Libor-OIS spread indicates that dollar-funding liquidity stress 
is low, which implies a healthy level of dollar liquidity in the market. 
 
In view of the foregoing, we include changes in Libor-OIS spread  ∆𝐿𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑘𝑡  as an additional regressor into 
our regressions to i) circumvent the omitted variable bias that could emanate from excluding Libor-OIS 
spread given its importance documented in previous studies – and ii) to control for changes in dollar-funding 
liquidity stress. The results are reported in the Table 2c below. 
 
Table 2c: Additional regression results for the 5-year and 3-month cross-currency basis 
  5-year basis   3-months basis   
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
 
 
-0.874*** -0.933*** -1.034** -1.075** 
 
(0.309) (0.314) (0.484) (0.494) 
 
 
 
-0.084*** -0.086*** -0.054 -0.055 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.040) (0.040) 
 
 
 
-0.635*** -0.656*** -0.549*** -0.557*** 
 
(0.108) (0.109) (0.170) (0.171) 
 
 
 
-0.639 -0.703 -3.218*** -3.258*** 
 
(0.791) (0.792) (1.240) (1.246) 
 
 
 
-0.007 -0.003 -0.043 -0.032*** 
 
(0.154) (0.154) (0.241) (0.243) 
 
 
-0.615*** -0.578*** -0.350 -0.332 
 
(0.152) (0.153) (0.238) (0.240) 
 -0.586 -0.560 -0.127 -0.115 
∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑢𝑠) 
∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑢𝑠) 
∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 
∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡 
∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡 
  
 
 
 
(0.369) (0.369) (0.578) (0.580) 
 
 
 
3.994*** 4.593*** 1.344 1.692 
 
(1.308) (1.329) (2.051) (2.092) 
 
 
 
-4.955*** -5.524*** -4.955*** -5.685 
 
(1.253) (1.273) (1.965) (2.004) 
 
 
 
-0.078*** -0.079*** -0.043 -0.043 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.037) (0.037) 
Observations 857 
 
857 857 
   
  
 
R2 0.195 0.202 0.074 0.075 
   
  
 
Fixed effects included?  No Yes No Yes 
Note *, **, *** 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively while standard errors in parenthesis are robust. Currency fixed effects are excluded. 
This table shows regression results of monthly changes in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross currency basis on changes in log CPI differential Δ(𝑝𝑘𝑡 
−𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆) (that is, inflation differential) and changes in PMI differential Δ(𝑦𝑘𝑡 −𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆), (relative economic performance) and other controls. The dependent 
variables are the monthly changes in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross-currency basis. The regressors of interest are the inflation differential Δ(𝑝𝑘𝑡 
−𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆) and relative economic performance Δ(𝑦𝑘𝑡 −𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆). The other independent variables (controls) are: Δ𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡, monthly change in the federal reserve 
board (FRB) trade-weighted broad dollar index, where Δ𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡>0 implies broad dollar appreciation ; Δ𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡, monthly change in the bilateral 
spot exchange rate of the local currency per dollar so that Δ𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡>0 implies appreciation of the dollar against the local currency; Δ𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡, monthly 
change in the log of volatility index (VIX), Δ𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡 change in the log of implied volatility on 3-month at-the-money currency options; Δ25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡, 
monthly change in the 25-delta risk reversal; Δ𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡 is the monthly change in yield spread; Δ(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡−𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑆) is the change in the term spread (TS), 
that is, the change in the difference between the foreign and US Treasury term spreads (10-year over 2-year), and ∆𝐿𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑘𝑡 is the change in Libor-
OIS spread. 
 
The results in Table 2c display the outcome of the additional robustness checks, with the impact of changes 
in Libor-OIS spread on the basis also displayed. Where significant, the results generally provide evidence 
of the negative association between both the basis and Libor-OIS indicators as is often reported in the 
literature. More importantly though, even with the inclusion of the new variable, Libor-OIS, together with 
the other controls to our regression, our main results remain robustly unchanged. The results also record 
some improvement in explanatory power via an increase in 𝑅2 from the inclusion of the additional control 
variable. In a nutshell, the negative effect of inflation differential on changes in the basis is robust even to 
the inclusion of an important control variable, Libor-OIS spread, which a vast number of previous studies 
have found to be influential in the cross-currency basis swap market. 
 
Meanwhile, as initially motivated, our main analysis in this article focuses on the post-crisis behavior of 
the cross-currency basis in response to the newly proposed macro drivers – inflation differential and relative 
economic performance. This is to ensure that our results capture the post crisis sample and are not driven 
by the GFC and its associated events that might influence the outcomes of our study. However, as cross-
currency basis swap spreads became most profound during the GFC and persisted subsequently, we extend, 
as an additional robustness test, our analysis to cover samples from an earlier start date of August 2007 to 
∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡 
∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 − 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑠) 
∆𝐿𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑘𝑡 
  
capture the emergence of the widespread basis across currencies. The results, which also control for changes 
in the Libor-OIS spreads and the other covariates, are reported in Table below.  
 
 
Table 2d: Additional regressions for 5-year and 3-month cross-currency basis (start date, August 2007) 
  5-year basis 3-months basis 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
 
 
-0.836*** -0.827** -0.324 -0.323 
 
(0.317) (0.323) (0.474) (0.483) 
 
 
 
-0.102*** -0.102*** -0.034 -0.033 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.042) (0.042) 
 
 
 
-0.868*** -0.867*** -0.486*** -0.485*** 
 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.161) (0.162) 
 
 
 
-2.761*** -2.766*** -3.830*** -3.842*** 
 
(0.854) (0.857) (1.278) (1.283) 
 
 
-0.180 -0.180 0.228 0.227 
 
(0.159) (0.160) (0.238) (0.239) 
 
 
-0.405*** -0.404*** -0.414** -0.412698** 
 
(0.133) (0.133) (0.199) (0.199) 
 
 
-1.189*** -1.187*** -0.981* -0.979* 
 
(0.353) (0.355) (0.529) (0.531) 
 
 
 
1.180 1.243 4.306** 4.378*** 
 
(1.116) (1.126) (1.671) (1.685) 
 
 
-3.344*** -3.393*** -4.416*** -4.469*** 
 
(0.972) (0.979) (1.454) (1.466) 
 
 
0.007 0.007 -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 1089 1089 1089 1089 
   
  
 
R2 0.179 0.179 0.082 0.082 
   
  
 
Fixed effects included?  No Yes No Yes 
Note *, **, *** 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively while standard errors in parenthesis are robust. Currency fixed effects are excluded. 
This table shows regression results of monthly changes in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross currency basis on changes in log CPI differential 
Δ(𝑝𝑘𝑡 −𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆) (that is, inflation differential) and changes in PMI differential Δ(𝑦𝑘𝑡 −𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆), (relative economic performance) and other controls. The 
dependent variables are the monthly changes in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross-currency basis. The regressors of interest are the inflation 
differential Δ(𝑝𝑘𝑡 −𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆) and relative economic performance Δ(𝑦𝑘𝑡 −𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆). The other independent variables (controls) are: Δ𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡, monthly change in 
the federal reserve board (FRB) trade-weighted broad dollar index, where Δ𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡>0 implies broad dollar appreciation ; Δ𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡, monthly 
∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑢𝑠) 
∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑢𝑠) 
∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 
∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡 
∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡 
∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡 
∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 − 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑠) 
∆𝐿𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑘𝑡 
  
change in the bilateral spot exchange rate of the local currency per dollar so that Δ𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡>0 implies appreciation of the dollar against the local 
currency; Δ𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡, monthly change in the log of volatility index (VIX), Δ𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡 change in the log of implied volatility on 3-month at-the-
money currency options; Δ25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡, monthly change in the 25-delta risk reversal; Δ𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡 is the monthly change in yield spread; Δ(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡−𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑆) is 
the change in the term spread (TS), that is, the change in the difference between the foreign and US Treasury term spreads (10-year over 2-year) 
and ∆𝐿𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑘𝑡 is the change in Libor-OIS spread. 
 
 
Again, overall, our main findings are robust and little-changed. The results in Table 2d show that previous 
findings are largely unaltered even after extending our sample to cover the GFC period and controlling for 
a host of variables which previous studies have found to have a notable impact on the cross-currency basis 
market. The results also provide evidence that our main findings are not altered by the GFC, otherwise the 
outcomes with and without including the GFC would have been completely different. In sum, we find that 
when inflation differential rises, i.e. when inflation increases in country 𝑖 relative to the US, the cross-
currency basis widens, i.e. becomes more negative. Wider basis gives rise to larger arbitrage opportunities 
of borrowing dollars cheaply in the cash market and lending dollars more profitably in the swap market, 
with currency risk exposure appropriately hedged. The higher the sensitivity of the basis to inflation 
differential, the wider or more negative it becomes following an increase in inflation differential, and the 
greater the arbitrage profit opportunities. 
 
Meanwhile, as presented in Appendix (Table A2), the coefficient of inflation differential over the isolated 
GFC sample period is positive, which is opposite to that presented above. There are several reasons for this. 
First, notice that the connection between inflation differential and changes in cross-currency basis appears 
positive over the GFC period when other covariates are not kept constant given that we do not controlled 
for these variables. Since they are not included in that regression, this implies they may vary in ways that 
conceal the original association between inflation differential and the basis if other factors were kept 
constant. Take for instance, it is well known that the GFC period coincides with the time when major central 
banks like the US Federal Reserve Bank provided large dollar swap lines to expand dollar supply, ease 
dollar shortages, improve dollar liquidity and strengthen the global banking system. This action, which 
could count as a positive dollar liquidity shock to the global banking system, might potentially have 
influenced the behavior of the basis across major currencies, especially when relevant variables are not 
properly controlled for in the regression specification, causing the basis to respond positively with a rise in 
inflation differential. However, the basis associates negatively with inflation differential outside the GFC 
period window, when such sudden acceleration in dollar liquidity splurge eased relatively or normalized. 
More importantly, it is interesting to note that after controlling for other relevant variables, including the 
Libor-OIS spread which is a gauge for dollar funding liquidity stress in the financial market, the negative 
relation between inflation differential and changes in the basis becomes largely dominant. 
 
5. Discussion of Results 
  
Table 2a displays our regression results for the monthly changes in the five-year and three-month cross-currency 
basis. We first estimate the baseline regressions involving the two regressors of interest which are inflation 
differential and relative economic performance. Then we increase the number of regressors each time by gradually 
including other control variables that have been identified in the literature as potential drivers of CIP deviations in 
the post crisis period. Table 2a shows the results of the estimated baseline regressions (Column 1) as well as the 
results of the robustness checks (Columns 3 to 8) where we also control for other important and previously identified 
drivers of CIP deviations. Table 2b displays results of further robustness checks where we include currency fixed 
effects. In all the regressions, the coefficient estimates on inflation differential and relative economic performance 
are consistently negative and significant across the 8 specifications we considered, even including the specifications 
with the broad dollar index as a control variable. These results suggest that higher inflation differential and greater 
economic performance, at least in the near term, are each associated with more negative cross-currency basis, and, 
by extension, larger CIP deviations. The robust and significantly negative relations between changes in cross-
currency basis and the above-mentioned drivers are true for both the 5-year basis, representing longer-term cross-
currency basis, and 3-month basis which represents short-dated hedging contracts.  
In terms of the magnitude, for the 5-year basis, the estimated coefficients on inflation differential and relative 
economic performance in Column 1, which excludes the control variables, implies that a one unit increase in 
inflation differential and in relative economic performance, in the foreign country viz-a-viz the US, is associated 
with more than and less than one basis point widening of the cross-currency basis, respectively, which implies 
wider CIP deviations. After including the dollar as a control variable in the specification as shown in Column 2, 
the previous results remain unaltered; that is, an increase in inflation differential and relative economic 
performance continues to induce wider cross-currency basis. Finally, we include all the control variables as shown 
in Column 8 and find that the narrative remains the same – our previous results is robust and significant. Hence, a 
rise in inflation differential and relative economic performance is associated with wider cross-currency basis and, 
hence, elevated CIP deviations. 
For the 3-month basis, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients when the controls are excluded shows that a 
rise in inflation differential and relative economic performance widens the cross-currency basis by more than and 
less than one basis point respectively. When we include the dollar as a control, the results remain largely 
unchanged; we continue to see that even in the presence of the dollar, the identified variables bear a negative and 
significant relationship with the cross-currency basis. However, by the time all controls have been included, as 
shown in Column 8, we see that the effect of inflation differential remains robust and significant while relative 
economic performance, though retains its negative relationship with the three-month basis, loses its significance. 
Consequently, across terms of the basis considered, our results suggest that the effects of inflation differential are 
more robust than relative economic performance. Also, not only is the impact of inflation differential on the basis 
more robust, it is equally more statistically significant and economically meaningful. These results are particularly 
interesting in light of the observation that readings of monthly inflation differential tend to be especially noisy and 
  
hence more volatile as they are more prone to and affected by one-time events. Further robustness checks, where 
we vary the sampling frequency, can be found in Appendix A2 to A3. 
Meanwhile, comparing the coefficients on our main regressors of interest, we see that the coefficients on inflation 
differential and relative economic performance for the 5-year basis are around 1.11 and 1.56 times greater than the 
corresponding coefficients for the 3-month basis. This suggests that when inflation differential and relative 
economic performance widen the basis, the effect is slightly higher in the longer end of the basis than for short-
dated contracts. The significantly negative between changes in the cross-currency basis and proposed drivers is 
not restricted to regressions without currency fixed effects. In Table 2b, we perform further robustness checks and 
obtain similar results for regression specifications that include currency fixed effects. In sum, our main results are 
unchanged whether or not currency fixed effects are included in the regressions. In terms of the controls, and in all 
specifications, we confirm the negative association between the broad dollar index and the cross-currency basis. 
This confirms the influential role of the broad dollar index as a significant global driver of variations in cross-
currency basis spreads whenever the broad dollar index is included in the regression. We also note that in all the 
specification, including the dollar also does not change our main results of the negative relationship between our 
proposed drivers and the cross-currency basis. 
In terms of the other control variables, our results reveal that the estimated coefficients on changes in VIX are 
significant and robust across all specifications, irrespective of which control is included. The magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients suggests that changes in VIX can have quantitatively large and significant effects on the 
cross-currency basis across maturities. If global risk sentiment worsens, as evidenced by a positive change in the 
VIX, the cross-currency basis tends to become more negative, implying wider CIP deviations. Meanwhile, changes 
in the implied volatility of currency options enter all regressions negatively, more so for the 5-year cross-currency 
basis. They are negatively associated with changes in the cross-currency basis. One possible explanation for this 
negative relation is that higher currency volatility in a given foreign currency elevates the degree of riskiness of 
that currency and the corresponding balance sheets that are denominated in the currency. This reduces the risk-
taking appetite of dollar-based financial intermediaries which in turn reduces the supply of dollar hedging activity, 
thereby leading to wider cross-currency basis. In addition, changes in FX option delta risk reversal, which measures 
the skewness of market expectations on future variations in currency value, are also negatively related with changes 
in the cross-currency basis.  
Czech (2017) notes that when FX option delta risk reversal is large and positive (negative), this implies that higher 
probabilities are attached to large appreciation (depreciation) of the base currency, in this case the dollar. An 
increase (decrease) in the risk reversal, therefore, would suggest that market perception is skewed towards dollar 
appreciation (depreciation). The negative relation between changes in FX option delta risk reversal and changes in 
the cross-currency basis thus suggests that a distribution skewed in the direction of dollar appreciation (or foreign 
currency depreciation), contributes to wider CIP deviations. Lastly, where significant, the yield spread correlates 
positively with the basis, while the term spread differential, which is the difference in the slope of the treasury yield 
  
curves between foreign countries and the US, enters negatively in the regression. In separate regressions, reported 
in the Appendix (A3i and A3ii), we repeat our analysis using a lower frequency (quarterly) which makes it feasible 
to include data on Australia and New Zealand. Once again, we obtain negative coefficient estimates on inflation 
differential and relative economic performance, providing further evidence that our main results are robust and 
remain intact across all specifications, especially for the 5-year basis. In brief, we find that when relative economic 
performance improves and inflation differential rises, the cross-currency basis becomes more negative. This is much 
more so for inflation differential. In the baseline regression, relative economic performance and inflation differential 
both exhibit a similar effect, of different magnitudes, on the basis. They tend to result in wider cross-currency basis. 
After controlling for the other drivers, we discover that our main result still holds and are even robust to the inclusion 
of the broad dollar index and global risk sentiment. More so, we continue to find a negative effect of an increase in 
the dollar strength and a rise in the global risk sentiment on the cross-currency basis.  
Finally, we provide comments on some possible ways that variations in these variables could potentially drive changes 
in CIP deviations. First, a rise in inflation differential between country 𝑘 and the US induces depreciation of currency 
k, which puts an upward pressure on dollar strength. As Avdjiev et al. (2019) note, higher dollar strength then leads 
to wider cross-currency basis across. Thus, a rise in inflation differential leads to wider basis if the currency 
depreciation, and, hence, dollar appreciation, that accompanies a higher inflation differential dominates in the 
transmission mechanism. We note that apart from the robustness and significance of results, the additional explanatory 
power is in general low. 
 
However, very importantly, it should be noted that the transmission mechanisms as described are not fully in 
line with the estimation results. We note that the scale and statistical significance of the negative relation between 
inflation differential and the basis, and between relative economic performance and the basis, especially at the 
5-year maturity, are largely unaffected with the inclusion of the broad dollar index and bilateral exchange rates 
in the regressions. This points to the existence of stronger transmission mechanisms, other than dollar 
appreciation, as responsible for the obtained relationship. One plausible transmission mechanism through which 
higher inflation differential could widen cross-currency basis swap spreads and worsen CIP deviations could be 
via an increase in demand for dollar-denominated fixed income assets (hedged into the benchmark rates of the 
non-dollar currencies). This is the dollar-asset demand channel.  
 
To understand this channel, first recall that fixed income investors receive stable nominal coupon payments4, so 
a rise in inflation differential (that is, inflation in, say, country A relative to US inflation) potentially harms fixed 
income returns in currency A as purchasing power declines with rising inflation given fixed nominal payments. 
To combat this scenario, one way is for investors to increase demand for dollar-denominated fixed income assets 
hedged into currency A5. This demand for dollar-denominated fixed income assets increases the cost of synthetic 
 
4   In the absence of interest rate swaps which investors exchange these fixed payments for some floating variable payments. 
5 This potentially could offer higher inflation-adjusted returns than those obtained from investing in currency A-denominated bonds 
  
dollars, i.e. offshore dollar cost, which then widens the cross-currency basis and expands deviations from CIP. 
In brief, the mechanism is such that higher inflation differential between country A relative to the US partly 
drives demand for dollar-denominated fixed income assets, raises demand for dollar funding and hedging 
activities, and widens the cross-currency basis. This channel takes the view that wider CIP deviations is a result 
of investors’ desire to avoid the ills of rising inflation, i.e. erosion of real returns or invested capital, by holding 
dollar-denominated fixed income assets (hedged into local currency). 
 
In summary, the mechanism described above, that works through the dollar, though plausible, does not appear 
dominant given that the effect of inflation differential on the basis remains unchanged and highly significant 
even after controlling for the dollar. This means that even without any changes in the broad dollar exchange rate, 
inflation differential still retains its effect on the basis, suggesting the possibility of a standalone, direct impact 
of inflation differential on changes in the basis. While we do not claim that a direct, unaided impact of inflation 
differential on the basis has been firmly established, we also do not claim to have uncovered the specific variables 
or mechanisms through which inflation differential influences the basis. In short, we do not discount the 
possibility that inflation differential may be working through other more plausible mechanisms or variables or, 
we just have not conclusively identified what they are in this paper. 
 
Fig 2: Inflation Differential and Cross-currency Basis – A PossibleTransmission Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Avdjiev et al. (2019) show that stronger dollar leads to wider basis (C to D).  This paper shows that higher inflation differential also widens 
the basis (A to D). 
 
The mechanism for the link between relative economic performance and cross-currency basis is more nuanced.  
Economic performance is a gauge for perceived systemic risk in an economy. This means that poor economic conditions 
could indicate heightened uncertainty, thus signifying risks for economic agents, corporate financial performance and, 
by extension, the broader financial market. To the extent that credit spreads turn on economic performance, weaker 
economic performance should therefore widen credit spreads. Chen (2010) finds that credit spreads widen in response to 
poor economic performance. Accordingly, we would expect better economic performance to lower credit spreads, 
A  
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D 
A = Rise in Inflation Differential                      C = Stronger Dollar 
B= Currency Depreciation                                D = Wider Basis 
 
C              D    (Avdjiev et al. (2019) ) 
A              D    ( This Article (2020) ) 
  
implying lower borrowing costs. To the extent that lower borrowing costs attract nondollar issuance or borrowing by 
agents whose final currency of choice is the US dollar (i.e. those agents for whom US dollar is funded via cross-currency 
swaps using nondollar currencies, e.g. Japanese yen or euro, as a funding currency), demand for dollar hedges would 
rise, leading to a wider basis6. This interplay is highlighted in Arai et al. (2016) who show how the activities of nondollar 
agents who fund their dollar positions via currency swaps exert a widening pressure on the basis. They also document 
how lower credit spreads in a given currency triggers both dollar and nondollar agents, especially corporates, to fund 
their dollar demand via cross-currency swaps by first issuing cheaply in low credit spreads currencies and swapping 
proceeds to US dollars, which raises demand for US dollars in the swap market and widens the basis. Borio et al. (2018), 
in a recent study, also provides an exposition into how elevated hedging demand in currency swap markets via foreign 
currency issuance have contributed to wider basis.  Thus, a positive change in relative economic performance can lead 
to wider cross-currency basis if demand for dollar hedges dominates in the transmission mechanism.  
Another plausible way to partly view this relationship is through the interaction between lower funding costs and relative 
funding conditions, particularly the relative funding liquidity risk premium channel recently documented in Kohler and 
Muller (2018) and previously motivated in Wong et al. (2016). To build intuition, let us first define relative funding 
liquidity risk premium. According to Kohler and Muller (2018), relative funding liquidity risk premium expresses the 
preference of holding one currency (foreign currency), or collateral denominated in that currency, over another currency 
(US dollar). When this preference is high, agents (US dollar-based agents) demand a low premium to hold the foreign 
currency. Consequently, relative funding liquidity risk premium drops. This scenario played out during the GFC when 
non-US banks could access US dollars against their non-US dollar denominated collateral using the central bank US 
dollar swap line via their home central banks. On the other hand, when the preference is low, US dollar-based agents 
would demand a high premium to hold that foreign currency or accept collateral denominated in it. In this case, relative 
funding liquidity risk premium rises.  This could happen, for instance, if foreign financial institutions have limited ability 
to access a US dollar facility against non-US dollar denominated collateral.  
 
Intuitively, lower borrowing costs in foreign currencies, which raise currencies’ relative abundance or trigger significant 
capital outflows, are a potential risk factor that could lower US dollar-based investors’ preference for the foreign 
currencies, leading them to demand a high relative funding liquidity risk premium to hold these currencies. And as Kohler 
and Muller (2018) note, the presence of a positive and persistent relative funding liquidity risk premium, which signals 
market’s preference for holding US dollars over most other currencies, then leads to significant departure from CIP, 
manifesting as cross-currency basis widening vis-`a-vis the US dollar. 
 
 
6
 Often, when there are indications of better economic performance, credit spreads tend to tighten as improved economic confidence reduces uncertainty, increases 
business confidence and improves general perception of risk. The lower spreads induce issuance in these currencies as lower spreads imply lower funding costs, 
consequently leading to a higher hedging demand for dollar swaps and a wider basis.  In general, higher issuance in a nondollar currency can generate positive 
shocks to demand for hedging activity that leads to higher demand for dollar hedges and, through that, a wider cross-currency basis which worsens CIP deviations.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3: Relative Economic Performance and Cross-currency Basis – Transmission Mechanism 
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6. Inflation differential beta and the magnitude of the basis across currencies 
 
In the last section, we provided empirical evidence that inflation differential drives changes in the cross-
currency basis. In addition to that, in this section, we further examine the cross-sectional relations between 
i) sensitivity of the basis to inflation differential (the so-called inflation beta) and ii) the magnitude of the 
basis. This is with a goal of determining whether different loadings on inflation differential, that is the 
inflation betas, can help to explain the magnitudes of the bases across currencies. To do this, we separately 
regress changes in the basis on inflation differential over time for each currency. We then collect the 
coefficients on the inflation differentials, which are the estimated factor loadings on inflation differentials, 
i.e. the inflation betas, for all currencies. Finally, we perform a cross-sectional regression where we regress 
the mean cross-currency bases for all currencies on their corresponding inflation betas. This gives the 
coefficient on the inflation beta in the cross-sectional regression. If the mean basis regressed on the inflation 
beta yields a positive and significant coefficient on the inflation beta, then there is evidence that inflation 
differential is a priced risk factor for the basis and can help to significantly explain the magnitude of the 
basis in the cross-section. In other words, they can explain the differences in the basis seen across countries. 
More formally, following the same methodology as in Avdjiev et al. (2019), let µk be the loading on the 
inflation differential for currency k, where µk is understood as the sensitivity of currency k’s basis to 
inflation differential. When µk increases, this indicates that currency k’s basis has become more sensitive 
to inflation differential. Let 𝑚𝑏𝑘 be the average value of the cross-currency basis for currency k, where, for 
each k, 𝑚𝑏𝑘 is the average taken over the sample period. If differing responses of the basis to inflation 
differential, i.e. µk, is the reason for the differences observed in the magnitudes or average values of the 
  
bases across currencies, then we would expect  µk to have a positive and significant effect on 𝑚𝑏𝑘. That is, 
a cross-sectional regression of 𝑚𝑏𝑘 on µk should yield a positive and statistically significant coefficient on µk. In such case, we would say that inflation differential acts as a potential risk factor which is priced into 
market participants’ (dollar agents) decisions and leads them to demand a premium, i.e. higher arbitrage 
profit, equivalent to the widest or most negative basis they can possibly get, to incentivize them enough to 
take up arbitrage positions (i.e. pay the basis) and get compensated for exposure to the inflation risk factor. 
That is, the sensitivity of the basis to inflation differential partly determines how much arbitrage profit a 
basis arbitrageur would expect or be willing to realize from an arbitrage trade. The higher the sensitivity, 
the higher the arbitrage profit that would be demanded or expected as compensation for exposure to the risk 
factor. Thus, a basis that is highly sensitive to inflation differential would normally be expected to provide 
the most premium or arbitrage profit.  
The results of cross-sectionally regressing the average cross-currency basis of each currency on the 
corresponding inflation beta are displayed in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Cross-sectional relationship between inflation beta and average basis across currencies 
 
Mean 5-year Basis Mean 3-month Basis 
Inflation Beta 37.398*** 20.107*** 
 
(6.490) (4.282) 𝑹𝟐 0.805 0.812 
   
 
  
 
 
Table 3 reports the regression coefficients obtained from regressing the average basis on the inflation beta. 
The coefficients on the inflation beta are strongly significant both for the five-year basis and the three-
month basis. A one-unit increase in the magnitude of inflation beta, which is associated with a wider cross-
currency basis, would correspond to 37 and 28 basis points rise in the magnitude of the basis, on average, 
for the 5-year and 3-month basis which corresponds to expected returns of 37 basis points based on the 
five-year CIP deviations and 28 basis points based on the 3-month CIP deviations. 
 
To provide a visual view of the cross-sectional relationship between inflation beta and mean cross-
currency basis, Fig 4 shows a graph of the average basis, plotted on the horizontal axis (X-axis), and the 
associated inflation beta on the vertical axis (Y-axis). The graphs show a strong positive relationship 
***, **, * is significance at 1%, 5% & 10%. Standard error in parenthesis. Inflation beta is the coefficient on the inflation beta. It is 
estimated by regressing the average (mean) basis on the inflation beta. The inflation beta is the estimated coefficient from regressing 
monthly changes in the basis on inflation differential at a monthly frequency for each country. For each country, average basis is 
computed as the average between January 2010 to December 2018.                                                                                                                       
Source:  Authors, 2020. 
  
between the average basis and the inflation beta with a correlation of 0.898 for the five-year basis and 
0.901 for the three-month basis. 
Fig 4: Cross-currency basis and inflation beta  
 
 
Note:  The vertical axis shows the inflation beta - which is the regression coefficient gotten by running monthly regression of changes in the cross-
currency basis on the inflation differential. The horizonal axis shows the average cross-currency basis, expressed in basis points, where the average is 
taken between January 2010 and December 2018. Left graph is generated with the 5-year basis, while right graph is with the 3-month basis. The 
straight line is a linear regression line (line of best fit), and the correlation between the level of the basis and the inflation beta is 0.898 for the 5-year 
basis and 0.901 for the 3-month basis respectively. 
In sum, our results propose that cross-currency basis spreads associated with countries experiencing higher 
inflation differential tend to command higher expected returns for CIP arbitrage positions. The arbitrage 
returns are potentially higher for the 5-year basis compared to the 3-month basis for the same unit increase 
in the magnitude of the inflation differential beta. 
6.1 Out-of-sample Robustness Check of Inflation Differential as a Risk Factor 
We have shown, in the preceding section, that inflation differential is a potential risk factor which is priced 
into economic agents’ pricing kernel in the fixed income/currency derivatives markets. We also document 
that higher value of this risk factor, which corresponds to higher sensitivity of the basis to inflation 
differential, commands a higher risk premium in the form of higher expected arbitrage returns (i.e. taking 
positions when the basis is widest or most negative) demanded by economic agents as compensation for 
exposure to the risk factor. This documentation was evidenced by a positive coefficient on the inflation beta 
in a single cross-sectional regression involving inflation differential betas and the mean levels of the cross-
currency bases across countries. The setup of the single cross-sectional regression involves regressing the 
mean levels of the bases on the factor loadings (i.e. the factor betas/inflation betas). 
 
Whilst true that this single cross-sectional regression approach is instructive and has its place in the 
literature, it is important to note that testing for the significance of the factor loadings (i.e. estimated 
inflation-differential betas) in this manner has its drawback. One potential reason is that the factor loadings 
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on which the mean levels of the bases are regressed are themselves estimated from the first-differenced 
bases, possibly introducing some cross-sectional bias. Moreover, inferences from such set up might be 
weakened by heteroskedastic and serial correlation issues, biasing the standard errors and test statistics. 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) method, which is widely employed in the empirical asset pricing literature, provides 
a way to limit these issues. Therefore, as an additional robustness check, we perform further scrutiny by 
using Fama-Macbeth (1973) method to rigorously examine whether inflation differential is a potential risk 
factor for the basis. This allows us to contribute to this article in this section in two additional ways. First, 
we employ the Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure to re-examine our initial finding that inflation differential 
is a priced risk factor for the cross-currency basis. Second, and more interestingly, we implement this 
procedure in an out-of-sample framework where we use data samples outside of the original sample period 
used in the preceding analysis. To this end, we choose more recent data from February 2019 to January 
2020 covering the subsequent 12 months after the end of the original sample period. The aim of this exercise 
is to further inspect how results holds true for fresh, neutral data that have not been included in previous 
analysis.  
Below, we first briefly describe the Fama-Macbeth (1973) method and implementation before we display 
the results. 
 
 
6.1.1 The Fama-Macbeth Method 
 
Suppose there are 𝑖 = 1, 2, … . . , 𝑛 cross-currency bases, with each observed over 𝑡 = 1, 2, … . , 𝑇 time 
periods, where the frequency of observations could, for example, be monthly, in which case 𝑡 = 1, 2, … . , 𝑇 
would be understood as 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 1 up to 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑇. In each time period 𝑡, let the changes in each basis 𝑖  be 
represented as ∆𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡. Suppose further that there exists a risk factor 𝑓𝑖𝑡 common to all countries but 
assumes different values in each country and varies with time over the 𝑡 = 1, 2, … . , 𝑇 time periods. In our 
application, 𝑓𝑖𝑡 represents the inflation differential associated with ∆𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 for each 𝑖, where 𝑖 =1, 2, … . . , 𝑛 
 
First, we set up and run 𝑛 individual time series regressions where, for each 𝑖 = 1, 2,… . . , 𝑛, the time series 
regression is performed over the 𝑇 time periods. We regress changes in each basis on the corresponding 
risk factor (i.e. the inflation differential) over the time period. Thus, we estimate one-by-one the following 
system of regressions 
{  
   ∆𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦1𝑡 = 𝜑1 + 𝛽1𝑓1𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡∆𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦2𝑡 = 𝜑2 + 𝛽2𝑓2𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑡. .. .. .∆𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑡 = 𝜑𝑛 + 𝛽𝑛𝑓𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡                                                                    (5) 
  
 
This gives 𝑛 estimated betas i.e. (𝛽1, 𝛽2, …, 𝛽𝑛), each representing the inflation differential beta or factor 
loading associated with each basis 𝑖. It measures the sensitivity of changes in the basis to inflation 
differential for each basis. This is the first stage of the procedure, which essentially involves estimating the 
factor loadings, (𝛽1, 𝛽2, …, 𝛽𝑛),. 
 
In the second past regression, which is the heart of Fama-Macbeth (1973) method, we formulate and run 𝑇 
different cross-sectional regressions; that is, we run a cross-sectional regression for each time period 𝑡 =1, 2, … . , 𝑇. This 𝑇 cross-sectional regressions involve regressing changes in all bases on their corresponding 
factor loadings, starting from the first time period 𝑡 = 1 and repeating the same process up until the last 
time period 𝑡 = 𝑇, where the factor loadings are unchanged over each of the 𝑇 time periods for which the 
cross-sectional regressions are conducted. Thus, the following system of 𝑇 cross-sectional regressions are 
estimated one after the other for each of the time period 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇: 
  
{  
   ∆𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑖1 = 𝑞1 + 𝜇1𝛽𝑖 + 𝜖1𝑡∆𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑖2 = 𝑞2 + 𝜇2𝛽𝑖 + 𝜖2𝑡. .. .. .∆𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑇 = 𝑞𝑛 + 𝜇𝑇𝛽𝑖 + 𝜖𝑛𝑡                                                             (6) 
 
where 𝜇𝑡, 𝑡 = 1,2,… , 𝑇 are the coefficients on the factor loadings and are used to compute the metric that 
helps us to determine whether inflation differential is a priced risk factor for the basis. The metric is obtained 
by averaging 𝜇?̂?, the estimated values of 𝜇𝑡, over time as follows 𝜇 ̂ = 1𝑇∑𝜇?̂?𝑇𝑡=1  
 
where 𝜇𝑡 are taken as independent and identically distributed and, as a result, we have 
 𝜎2(𝜇 ̂) = 1𝑇 𝜎2(𝜇?̂?),where  𝜎2(𝜇?̂?) = 1𝑇∑(𝜇?̂? − 𝜇 ̂)2𝑇𝑡=1   and 𝑡 = 𝜇 ̂𝜎(𝜇?̂?)/√𝑇 
 
If 𝜇 ̂ > 0 significantly, then inflation differential is a risk factor and larger factor exposure – which in our 
case corresponds to greater sensitivity of the basis to inflation differential – would attract a higher 
magnitude of arbitrage profit, which would also imply that inflation differential is a priced risk factor. One 
major advantage of the Fama-Mac Beth approach over, for instance, a single cross-sectional regression 
involving time-averaged dependent variables regressed on their corresponding factors is that the latter is 
  
often plagued with empirical issues and weakened by the occurrence of heteroskedastic and autocorrelated 
estimates, resulting in biased standard errors and 𝑡 statistic. 
 
Having briefly described the Fama-Macbeth method, we present in the next section the results of its second 
past regression which tests the coefficient of the factor beta to ascertain if there is an out-of-sample evidence 
that the averaged period-by-period factor beta coefficient over the entire time period 𝑇 is different from 
zero, which would imply that inflation differential is a risk factor.  
 
4.3 Fama and Macbeth Second Past Regression Results 
 
Table 4 below displays results obtained by implementing the Fama and Macbeth method over the 12-month 
out-of-sample period (February 2019 through January 2020), where  𝜇 ̂ represents the average value of the 
estimated coefficients on inflation differential betas from the period-by-period cross-sectional regressions 
while ?̅?2 is average value of the 𝑅2’s from these regressions.  
 
Table 4: Fama and Macbeth Regression Results 
  𝝁 ̂ 𝝈(𝝁 ̂) = 𝝈(𝝁?̂?)/√𝑻 t-stat ?̅?𝟐 
5-year basis 0.33*** 0.13 2.58 0.27 
3-month basis -0.07 0.05 1.28 0.08 𝜇 ̂ represents the average of the monthly coefficient on the factor loadings from the cross-sectional regressions over the 12-month 
period from February 2019 to January 2020, with outliers removed, 𝜎(𝜇 ̂) is the standard error of 𝜇 ̂, and ?̅?2 is the average 𝑅2 value 
that comes from each monthly cross-sectional regression that gives rise to the coefficient on inflation beta used to estimate 𝜇 ̂. The 
results are displayed mostly for both the five-year basis and the three-month basis.  
 
 
Table 3 shows that the averaged value 𝜇 ̂ of the coefficients on the inflation betas is positive 𝜇 ̂ > 0 and 
significant for the five-year basis but insignificant for the three-month basis. Moreover, the absolute size of 
the coefficient 𝜇 ̂ is several times higher for the 5-year basis than the 3-month basis. Thus, the identified 
factor, inflation differential, is a priced risk factor for the 5-year basis in our out of sample specification. 
The stronger out-of-sample connection between the average value of the coefficients on inflation betas, 𝜇 ̂, 
and the 5-year basis partly echoes the previous in-sample finding that arbitrage returns are potentially more 
significant for the 5-year basis compared to the 3-month basis for the same rise in the magnitude of the 
factor loadings. That is, the 5-year basis is more sensitive to inflation differential or its sensitivity to 
inflation differential is more stable. 
 
Below, we also provide a visual view of how the coefficients on the factor loadings from the 
period-by-period cross-sectional regressions vary over the out-of-sample 12-month period. 
 
  
Fig 5: Monthly Cross-sectional Regression Estimates of Coefficients on Factor Loadings and the Corresponding 𝑹𝟐 
 
 
Fig. 5 displays the graphs of the coefficients on the inflation factor loadings for the 12-month period. We 
see that the coefficients are mostly positive for the 5-year basis than the 3-month basis, suggesting that, in 
the 12-month period, inflation differential is a more important risk factor for the 5-year basis than the 3-
month basis. 
In any case, where 𝜇 ̂ is different from zero, we say that the proposed factor – inflation differential—is a 
risk factor and priced with a premium for the basis. This means that varying exposure or sensitivity to this 
risk factor explains some of the discrepancies in the magnitude of arbitrage profit across the dollar bases of 
different currencies. As such, economic agents would demand a high premium (i.e. larger arbitrage profit) 
when basis exposure or sensitivity to inflation differential is high. The phenomenon is particularly notable 
for the 5-year basis. In sum, with the Fama and Macbeth method, we are able to provide out-of-sample 
evidence that inflation differential can indeed be a risk factor for the basis. Thus, currencies whose dollar 
bases are highly sensitive to inflation differential command a higher premium via larger expected returns 
from CIP arbitrage positions, where the arbitrage returns are potentially higher for the 5-year basis than the 
3-month basis for the same exposure to inflation differential. 
7. Conclusion 
Over the last decade, the foreign exchange derivatives market has witnessed an uninhibited collapse of 
covered interest parity (CIP), which has given rise to large CIP deviations and exploitable arbitrage opportunities 
across currencies. While there exists a growing literature on the nuances of CIP deviations across currencies and 
the links between market variables and cross-currency basis in the foreign exchange derivatives market, the 
literature on the drivers of the cross-currency basis – especially on the link between cross-currency basis, real 
economic performance and inflation dynamics – is still limited.  
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Understanding and untangling the drivers of the cross-currency basis, particularly the link between the basis and 
standard gauge of economic performance, is of key importance to policymakers and global foreign-exchange 
reserve managers at reserve banks, treasury departments and sovereign wealth funds for optimum currency 
management of diverse reserve assets and the management of large reserves liquidity profiles. This is to 
help managers reduce risk and be well-positioned to meet domestic and international financial stability 
obligations. More so, the issue is important for multilateral and international development institutions who 
seek to raise funds at the most favorable possible cost to support vulnerable economies and contribute to critical 
global stabilization efforts whilst working to promote economic prosperity through partnering with public and 
private sectors in developing market economies. 
In this paper, we propose a novel relationship, particularly between inflation differential and the cross-currency 
basis. Our main finding is that higher inflation differentials tend to induce widening effects on the cross-
currency basis.  Our main results are remarkable as they are generally unaltered even after controlling for a large 
number of covariates, including the broad dollar index which previous studies have found to exert a strong effect 
on the basis.  This paper is the first to empirically document a robust negative relationship between inflation 
differential and the cross-currency basis wherein when inflation differential goes up, cross-currency basis goes 
further down in the negative direction. Nonetheless, we note that apart from the robustness and significance of 
results, the additional explanatory power is in general low. We also find some evidence that if inflation 
differential is a risk factor, then a higher sensitivity of the basis to inflation differential, which means a rise in 
inflation differential triggers a more negative basis, should lead holders of the more special currency (dollar 
agents) to demand a higher premium, i.e. higher expected returns, which requires the basis to be more negative, 
before taking positions in a basis that is highly sensitive to inflation differential. That is, choosing to take 
positions when the basis is widest (most negative) in order to better position for the highest expected returns or 
arbitrage profit. 
One direct implication of our result is that any fiscal and or monetary policy tool which reins in inflation and, 
hence, inflation differential is likely to also put a floor on the widening of the cross-currency basis and hence 
limit CIP deviations. Our result also suggests that supply side policies which improve economic performance 
and lower inflation, and hence inflation differential, are also likely to lessen CIP deviations. This is because, as 
we have found, inflation differential has a more dominant effect on the cross-currency basis than relative 
economic performance. In this case, a fall inflation, which leads to tighter cross-currency basis, dominates 
the rise in economic performance that leads to wider cross-currency basis, ultimately tightening the basis and 
lowering CIP deviations. An interesting empirical exercise for future research would be to perform country-
specific analysis that examines the response of CIP deviations to the proposed factors in an effort to untangle 
further drivers of CIP deviations post crisis on a country-level basis. 
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Appendix  
A1: Graphs of the cross-currency basis together with consumer price index and purchasing manager index 
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Note:   The graphs above show plots of consumer price index, purchasing manager index and the cross-currency basis. Except for the cross-
currency basis which is plotted on the right-hand side axis, all the other variables, plotted on the left-hand side axis, are scaled by their 
largest magnitude so that, on the new scale, the highest magnitude corresponds to the value of 1 while the others are below 1. 
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A2: Regression results of the drivers of cross-currency basis, by period 
 
  
A3i: Regression results of the 5-year and 3-month cross-currency basis (quarterly frequency) 
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 -0.8937 -0.9204 -3.3277** -3.5138** -3.5494** -3.7921** 
   
(1.2156) (1.2127) (1.4385) (1.4518) (1.4497) (1.4625) 
 
 
 
 (1.437) (1.4355) (1.6843) (1.7032) (1.696) (1.7106) ∆𝑩𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒕    -0.6117 -0.6113 -0.5822 -0.634 -0.6391  ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡 
 
  0.5982 0.5971 0.6176 0.5357 0.5419 
    
(0.3999) (0.3999) (0.4001) (0.4013) (0.4013) 
 
 
 
  (0.4734) (0.4682) (0.4693) (0.4695) (0.4694) ∆𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒌𝒕     -0.2438 -0.2319 -0.2205 -0.1937  ∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡 
 
   0.7349*** 0.7433*** 0.7613*** 0.7288*** 
     
(0.2362) (0.2362) (0.2359) (0.2373) 
 
 
 
   (0.2766) (0.277) (0.276) (0.2776) ∆𝟐𝟓𝑫𝑹𝑹𝒌𝒕      -0.6717 -0.6931 -0.712  ∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡 
 
    -0.4739 -0.5078 -0.4849 
      
(0.5298) (0.5293) (0.5295) 
 
 
 
    (0.6216) (0.6192) (0.6194) ∆𝒀𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒌𝒕       -2.4858 -1.8052  ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡 
 
     -3.9319* -4.7572** 
      
 (1.8434) (1.9576) 
 
 
 
     (2.1566) (2.2899) ∆(𝑻𝑺𝒌𝒕 − 𝑻𝑺𝑼𝑺)        -1.8853  ∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 − 𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑆) 
 
      2.2861 
      
  (1.8268) 
 
 
 
      (2.1368) 
                  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 275 274 273 272 271 270 269 268  𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
275 274 273 272 271 270 269 268 𝑹𝟐 0.0408 0.1218 0.1651 0.1723 0.1755 0.1804 0.1859 0.1891  𝑅2 
0.0111 0.0158 0.0172 0.0229 0.0477 0.0498 0.0614 0.0654 
  Fixed effects included? No No No        No    No No No No    Fixed effects included? No No No No No No No No 
 Note *, **, *** 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. Currency fixed effects are excluded. This table shows regression results of monthly changes in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross currency basis on changes in log CPI differential ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆)  (that is, inflation differential) and changes in PMI differential ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆), (relative economic performance) and other controls. The dependent variables are the monthly changes in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross-currency 
basis. The regressors of interest are the inflation differential ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆) and relative economic performance  ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆). The other independent variables (controls) are: ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡, monthly change in the federal reserve board (FRB) trade-weighted 
broad dollar index, where ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡>0 implies broad dollar appreciation ; ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡, monthly change in the bilateral spot exchange rate of the local currency per dollar so that ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡 > 0 implies appreciation of the dollar against the local 
currency; ∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡, monthly change in the log of volatility index (VIX),  ∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡 change in the log of implied volatility on 3-month at-the-money currency options; ∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡,  monthly change in the 25-delta risk reversal; ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡 is the 
monthly change in yield spread; ∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 − 𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑆) is the change in the term spread (TS), that is, the change in the difference between the foreign and US Treasury term spreads (10-year over 2-year). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust. 
Sources: Bloomberg; FRED, author’s calculations 
  
    A3ii: Regression results of the 5-year and 3-month cross-currency basis, with currency fixed effects included (quarterly frequency): 
   
5-year basis 
       
  
3-month basis 
   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) ∆(𝒑𝒌𝒕 − 𝒑𝒌𝒕𝑼𝑺) -0.7089 -0.7316* -0.7497* -0.7641* -0.7105* -0.7519* -0.7561* -0.7731*  ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆) -0.6123 -0.6187 -0.6221 -0.6077 -0.7544 -0.7851 -0.7941 -0.7782 
 
(0.4416) (0.4240) (0.4138) (0.4129) (0.4153) (0.4160) (0.4160) (0.4156) 
  
(0.4940) (0.4937) (0.4944) (0.4939) (0.4915) (0.4932) (0.4911) (0.4913) ∆(𝒚𝒌𝒕 − 𝒚𝒕𝑼𝑺) -0.2729*** -0.2156** -0.1758** -0.1767** -0.1882** -0.201** -0.2043** -0.2127**  ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆) -0.138 -0.122 -0.1143 -0.1134 -0.082 -0.0915 -0.0984 -0.0905 
 
(0.0893) (0.0866) (0.0852) (0.085) (0.0855) (0.0859) (0.086) (0.0861) 
  
(0.1) (0.1008) (0.1017) (0.1016) (0.1012) (0.1019) (0.1015) (0.1018)         ∆𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒕  -0.6435*** -0.6373*** -0.5815*** -0.5415*** -0.5255*** -0.5713*** -0.5277***          ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡  -0.18 -0.1788 -0.2347 -0.3443** -0.3325** -0.43** -0.471*** 
 
 (0.1327) (0.1295) (0.1344) (0.1388) (0.1391) (0.1464) (0.15) 
  
 (0.1545) (0.1547) (0.1607) (0.1642) (0.165) (0.1728) (0.1773) ∆𝒍𝒏𝑽𝑰𝑿𝒕   -4.599*** -4.5719*** -3.6805** -3.9511*** -3.97*** -3.7165**  ∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡   -0.8825 -0.9096 -3.3493* -3.5495** -3.5897** -3.8282** 
 
  (1.2177) (1.2149) (1.4413) (1.4543) (1.4544) (1.4655) 
  
  (1.4548) (1.4533) (1.7057) (1.7244) (1.717) (1.7322) ∆𝑩𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒕    -0.6048 -0.6045 -0.5739 -0.6133 -0.6178  ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡    0.6057 0.6048 0.6274 0.5434 0.5476 
 
   (0.4009) (0.4006) (0.4008) (0.4027) (0.4022) 
  
   (0.4795) (0.4741) (0.4752) (0.4754) (0.4753) ∆𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒌𝒕     -0.2722 -0.2604 -0.2507 -0.2165  ∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡     0.7451*** 0.7538*** 0.7744*** 0.7421*** 
 
    (0.2372) (0.237) (0.2372) (0.2384) 
  
    (0.2807) (0.2811) (0.2801) (0.2817) ∆𝟐𝟓𝑫𝑹𝑹𝒌𝒕      -0.6923 -0.707 -0.7332  ∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡       -0.5122 -0.5434 -0.5187 
 
     (0.5313) (0.5314) (0.5311) 
  
     (0.6299) (0.6274) (0.6278) ∆𝒀𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒌𝒕       -1.8884 -0.9629  ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡       -4.0201* -4.8907** 
 
      (1.8753) (2.0038) 
  
      (2.214) (2.3684) ∆(𝑻𝑺𝒌𝒕 − 𝑻𝑺𝑼𝑺)        -2.4081  ∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 − 𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑆)        2.2651 
 
       (1.8536) 
  
       (2.1909) 
 
        
  
        
 
        
  
        𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 266 265 264 263 262 261 260 259  𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 266 265 264 263 262 261 260 259 𝑹𝟐 0.0412 0.1193 0.1645 0.1716 0.1758 0.1811 0.1843 0.1896  𝑅2 0.0121 0.0172 0.0185 0.0245 0.05 0.0524 0.0643 0.0681 
Fixed effects included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Fixed effects 
included? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note *, **, *** 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust. Currency fixed effects are included. This table shows regression results of monthly changes in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross 
currency basis on changes in log CPI differential ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆)  (that is, inflation differential) and changes in PMI differential ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆), (relative economic performance) and other controls. The dependent variables are the monthly 
changes in the 5-year and 3-month Libor cross-currency basis. The regressors of interest are the inflation differential ∆(𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑈𝑆) and relative economic performance  ∆(𝑦𝑘𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑈𝑆). The other independent variables (controls) are: ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡, 
monthly change in the federal reserve board (FRB) trade-weighted broad dollar index, where ∆𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡>0 implies broad dollar appreciation ; ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡, monthly change in the bilateral spot exchange rate of the local currency per dollar 
so that ∆𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡 > 0 implies appreciation of the dollar against the local currency; ∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡, monthly change in the log of volatility index (VIX),  ∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑡 change in the log of implied volatility on 3-month at-the-money currency 
options; ∆25𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑡,  monthly change in the 25-delta risk reversal; ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑘𝑡 is the monthly change in yield spread; ∆(𝑇𝑆𝑘𝑡 − 𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑆) is the change in the term spread (TS), that is, the change in the difference between the foreign and US 
Treasury term spreads (10-year over 2-year). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust.  Currency fixed effects are included in all specifications. Sources: Bloomberg; FRED, author’s calculations 
 
